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CASENOTES 
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE- UNDER THIRD PARTY BENE-
FICIARY THEORY, NONCLIENT CAN SUE ATTORNEY FOR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WITHOUT PROOF OF 
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 492 
A.2d 618 (1985). 
Mortgagors purchased a house, relying upon the assurance of the 
mortgagee's attorney that the lot was described correctly in the sales con-
tract. 1 The mortgagors built a swimming pool on their lot and, contem-
plating further improvements, obtained a new survey.2 This survey 
indicated that the sales contract had identified incorrectly the boundaries 
of their lot. 3 Although the mortgagors had not employed the attorney, 
they asserted that they were the intended beneficiaries of the contractual 
relationship between the mortgagee and the attorney.4 Based upon this 
third party beneficiary theory, the mortgagors brought suit against the 
attorney for malpractice, alleging breach of warranty, negligence, and 
negligent misrepresentation. 5 
The Circuit Court of Maryland for Frederick County sustained the 
attorney's demurrer because the mortgagors failed to allege facts suffi-
cient to prove that they were in privity of contract with the attorney or 
that they were the intended beneficiaries of the contract between the 
mortgagee and the attorney.6 On certiorari, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland7 reversed and held that under a third party beneficiary theory, 
a nonclient can sue an attorney for negligent misrepresentation without 
1. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 132, 492 A.2d 618, 626 (1985). Aware that the 
mortgagors did not retain separate counsel, the attorney assured them, "they were 
purchasing the property as described in the contract of sale, and that a dwelling and 
well were located on the property." Id. at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626. 
2. /d. at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626. After moving into their house, the mortgagors built 
a swimming pool and used a well that, according to the original survey, was on their 
property. The mortgagors, planning further improvements, ordered another survey 
which revealed that the well was not on their property and that the swimming pool, 
driveway, and retaining wall encroached upon their neighbor's property. Id. 
3. /d. As part of the settlement, the mortgagors received a survey that indicated incor-
rect boundaries. The mortgagee had ordered another survey that contained the cor-
rect boundaries, but it was not completed until approximately four weeks after 
settlement. Id. 
4. /d. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626-27. The mortgagors did not employ the attorney, but 
they did pay for the survey and ultimately paid the attorney's fee as part of the 
settlement costs. /d. at 132, 137 n.8, 492 A.2d at 626, 629 n.8. 
5. /d. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626-27. The first declaration was filed against the attorney 
and the surveyor, claiming negligence and breach of warranty against each party. 
The attorney's demurrer to this declaration was sustained with leave to amend. The 
mortgagors subsequently filed an amended declaration and then a second amended 
declaration containing an additional count for negligent misrepresentation against 
the attorney. The suit against the surveyor was dismissed voluntarily by the mortga-
gors so they could proceed to an immediate appeal against the attorney. Id. at 133-
34, 492 A.2d at 626-27. 
6. /d. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626-27. 
7. The mortgagors appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, but the 
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proof of privity of contract. 8 
Whether an attorney malpractice action is based upon a contract 
theory or a negligence theory,9 the plaintiff must prove that the attorney 
owed him a duty of care. 10 Traditionally, this duty of care required proof 
that there was privity of contract between the two parties. 11 If the plain-
tiff was not the attorney's client or employer, he could not bring an attor-
ney malpractice actionY There were two principal reasons for the 
traditional privity requirement: (1) to allow liability without contractual 
privity would deprive the parties to the contract control over their own 
agreement; and (2) a duty to the general public would impose a great 
potential burden of liability on the contracting parties. 13 A minority of 
jurisdictions still adhere to this traditional rule without exception. 14 
A growing trend among jurisdictions, however, is to find a duty of 
care owed by an attorney based upon a third party beneficiary theory 
even if the plaintiff is not the attorney's client or employer. 15 Generally, 
court of appeals granted certiorari prior to a decision by that court. /d. at 134, 492 
A.2d at 627. 
8. !d. at 137, 492 A.2d at 628. 
9. Attorney malpractice actions have been based on both contract and negligence theo-
ries of recovery. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 821 (1961) (contract), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Guy v. Liederbach, 
501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983) (contract); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 
440 N.E.2d 96 (1982) (negligence). For a discussion of the choice between contract 
and tort in Virginia, see Comment, Legal Malpractice in Virginia: Tort or Contract? 
16 U. RICH. L. REV. 907 (1982). 
10. Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 706, 255 A.2d 356, 364 (1969); 
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 101, at 171-76 (2d ed. 1981) 
[hereinafter MALLEN & LEVIT); D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: 
LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 1.1, at 1-3 (1980) [hereinafter MEISELMAN); W. PROSSER 
& W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS§ 93 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter 
PROSSER & KEETON). 
11. National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880) (establishing the traditional rule 
requiring privity in attorney malpractice); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, §§ 71-
72, at 142-43 (the strict requirement of privity defines the parameters of an attor-
ney's duty). 
12. See MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, §§ 71-73, at 142-46; see also Kendall v. Rog-
ers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943); Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d 
774 (1940). 
13. Annotation, Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than His Immediate Client, for Con-
sequences of Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1184 
(1972) [hereinafter Annotation]. 
14. See, e.g., Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 335 N.W.2d 554 (1983); Calamari v. 
Grace, 98 A.D.2d 74,469 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1983); First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blank-
enship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
15. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 80, at 156-60; Annotation, supra note 13, at 
1190-91. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 
(1961); Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); Needham v. Hamilton, 
459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983); Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, 467 
So. 2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 
N.E.2d 96 (1982); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Succession of Kil-
lingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973); Simon v. Zipperstein, No. 86-9655 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Omni file); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 
47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). 
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a third party beneficiary contract arises when two parties enter into a 
contract with the intent to confer a direct benefit on a third party. 16 
Although governed by principles of contract law, the third party benefici-
ary theory has been used by analogy to prove the duty element in negli-
gence actions. 17 Whether the malpractice action is based upon a contract 
theory 18 or a negligence theory, 19 the plaintiff can allege third party ben-
eficiary status as an exception to the privity requirement, provided he is 
one of a class of persons specifically intended to benefit from the attor-
ney's employment. 
Under the third party beneficiary theory, the plaintiff must prove 
that the client's actual purpose for employing the attorney was to benefit 
the plaintiff. 2° For example, named beneficiaries to a will can bring an 
attorney malpractice action against the testator's attorney. 21 Accord-
ingly, the third party beneficiary theory does not apply in an adversary 
context because an attorney can owe no duty to an adverse party.22 In 
determining whether the plaintiff is an intended third party beneficiary, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied upon the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts which defines intended beneficiaries:23 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition 
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties and either 
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obliga-
tion of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to 
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 24 
The third party beneficiary theory is governed, not by negligence law, but 
by traditional, well-recognized principles of contract law.25 Thus, if the 
16. 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 347 (3d ed. 1959); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302, 304 (1981). 
17. See Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96. 
18. See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821; Stowe, 184 Conn. 194, 
441 A.2d 81; Guy, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744. 
19. See Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96. 
20. See id.; see also Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Marker v. Greenberg, 
313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981). 
21. See, e.g., Stowe, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81; Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 81 
(D.C. 1983); Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96; Succession of Killingsworth, 292 
So. 2d 536 (La. 1973); Guy, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744. 
22. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 79, at 154. 
23. Guy, 501 Pa. at 59-61, 459 A.2d at 751. 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981). 
25. Guy, 501 Pa. at 62, 459 A.2d at 752. See Annotation, supra note 13, at 1186 ("this 
[third party beneficiary] approach has the merit of being a well-recognized concept 
with considerable case authority"); Note, Attorney Malpractice- Third Party Bene-
ficiaries - Named Beneficiaries Under a Will May Bring a Cause of Action in As-
sumpsit Against the Drafting Attorney, 88 DICK. L. REV. 535, 546 (1984) 
[hereinafter Note, Attorney Malpractice] (because liability is governed not by negli-
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client's intent to benefit the plaintiff was not actual, but merely foresee-
able, the exception is not satisfied. 
Nevertheless, under a "balancing test" theory, a minority of courts 
hold that if a client's intent to benefit the plaintiff is merely foreseeable, 
liability to a third party may be found. 26 The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia identified foreseeability as one of six factors considered to determine 







the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect 
the plaintiff; 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; 
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injuries suffered; 
the extent to which third party suits impose a burden on 
the legal profession; and, 
the policy of preventing future harm. 28 
Although each factor is considered, none is determinative.29 Under 
this approach an attorney may owe a duty to a person not intended to 
benefit from his services, but who foreseeably may be injured by his negli-
gence. 30 The factors involve policy considerations that are imprecise and 
balanced inconsistently.31 This approach, therefore, is less predictable 
than the third party beneficiary exception adopted by a majority of 
gence principles, but by contract principles, the class of persons to whom the attor-
ney may be liable is more restrictive). 
26. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Breese, 138 Ariz. 508, 675 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1983); 
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). 
27. See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (overruling Buckley v. 
Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895) (requiring strict privity for an attorney mal-
practice action)). The attorney in Lucas, however, was found not guilty of negli-
gently drafting a will that violated the Rule Against Perpetuities because the rule 
was too difficult even for attorneys to understand. Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 592, 364 
P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826. 
28. !d. at 588-89, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. The original balancing 
test, as set forth in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958), 
included as a factor the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct. The Lu-
cas court replaced the "moral blame" factor with a consideration of the burden 
imposed on the profession. Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 588-89, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. at 823-24. Subsequent decisions have considered the moral blame factor. See 
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Donald v. 
Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971). 
29. See Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 144 
(1982) (test fails to indicate whether a duty exists if any one of the factors is not 
met). 
30. See id.; see also MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 81, at 161. 
31. See Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Malpractice: The Growing Accept-
ance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 48, 60-61 (1981) 
[hereinafter Note, Attorney's Liability]; Note, Attorney Malpractice, supra note 25, at 
543-44. 
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jurisdictions. 32 
Whether courts follow the third party beneficiary theory or the bal-
ancing test theory to determine a nonclient's standing to sue, an attorney 
malpractice action based upon a negligence theory may be alleged in 
terms of negligence33 or negligent misrepresentation.34 Negligence is al-
leged more often than negligent misrepresentation because a cause of ac-
tion for negligence exists regardless of whether there was an error of 
judgment, inadvertance, or misrepresentation. 35 Liability in negligence 
generally requires proof of a duty and damage caused by a breach of that 
duty. 36 In Maryland, however, the plaintiff also must prove an employ-
ment relationship between the plaintiff and the attorney.37 
Liability for negligent misrepresentation generally requires, in addi-
tion to the traditional elements of negligence, a negligent statement or 
representation as well as a rightful reliance upon that negligent represen-
tation.38 Consequently, in an adversary context, negligent misrepresenta-
tion is unavailable because reliance upon an opponent's attorney is 
unjustifiable. 39 In Maryland, unlike an attorney malpractice action in 
ordinary negligence, proof of an employment relationship between the 
plaintiff and the attorney is unnecessary if the action is based upon negli-
gent misrepresentation.40 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has followed the majority view 
32. See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 57, 459 A.2d 744, 749 (1983) (rejecting the 
Lucas approach because it "has led to ad hoc determinations and inconsistent re-
sults"). For an example of the inconsistent results of the balancing test, compare 
Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) 
(attorney held not liable to stock purchasers who relied upon erroneous advice given 
to his client about the stock) with Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitzs, 
57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (attorney held liable to lender who 
the attorney knew would rely upon erroneous advice given to his client about a 
partnership's status). 
33. See MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 44, at 93-94. 
34. /d. § 111, at 204-06. 
35. /d. § 44, at 93. 
36. ld. § 100, at 169; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 30, at 164-65. 
37. Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 611-12, 31 A.2d 312, 315 (1943). The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland adopted a three-part test from Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916): 
(1) the attorney's employment; 
(2) his neglect of a reasonable duty; and 
(3) loss to the client proximately caused by that neglect of duty. 
Kendall, 181 Md. at 611-12, 31 A.2d at 315. 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 
10, § 44, at 93-94. 
39. See MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 44, at 94. 
40. A negligent misrepresentation action in Maryland requires proof of five elements: 
(1) The defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently as-
serts a false statement; 
(2) The defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the 
plaintiff; 
(3) The defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on 
the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; 
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in permitting a third party beneficiary exception to the privity require-
ment for attorney malpractice actions. In Prescott v. Coppage,41 the court 
found that a preferred creditor was a third party beneficiary of the rela-
tionship between an attorney and a debtor's receiver.42 The court held 
that the preferred creditor had standing to sue the attorney representing 
the debtor's receiver because the attorney improperly distributed the 
debtor's assets.43 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, in Clagett v. 
Dacy,44 interpreted the exception recognized in Prescott to apply only to 
actions based upon a contract theory, not a negligence theory.45 The 
Clagett court recognized that the third party beneficiary theory relaxed 
the privity requirement, but found that the plaintiff's declaration did not 
state a cause of action because it failed to allege that the plaintiff was part 
of a class of persons specifically intended to benefit from the attorney's 
employment.46 Recently, the same court expressly declined to decide 
whether a will beneficiary can maintain a legal malpractice action against 
the testator's attorney for the negligent preparation or execution of a 
will.47 The court rejected the beneficiary's cause of action because the 
asserted testamentary intention was not apparent on the face of the 
will. 48 Consequently, the question of whether an attorney is liable to a 
third party beneficiary under a negligence theory was left unresolved.49 
In Flaherty v. Weinberg, 50 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ad-
dressed this issue and held, "although [the third party beneficiary excep-
tion] is 'peculiarly applicable' to contract actions, ... the scope of duty 
concept in negligence actions may be analogized to the third party benefi-
ciary concept in the context of attorney malpractice cases."51 The court 
explained, "the test for third party recovery is whether the [client's] in-
tent to benefit [the nonclient] actually existed, not whether there could 
(4) The plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; 
and 
(5) The plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 337, 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982). 
41. 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972). 
42. Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 574-76, 296 A.2d 150, 156-57 (1972) (the attor-
ney knew or should have known that the debtor owed a continuing obligation to a 
preferred creditor). 
43. Id. at 574, 296 A.2d at 156-57. 
44. 47 Md. App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285 (1980). 
45. Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md. App. 23, 28, 420 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1980). 
46. /d. at 30, 420 A.2d at 1290. 
47. Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 12, 478 A.2d 713, 718, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 
484 A.2d 274 (1984). 
48. Id. at 3, 478 A.2d at 714. 
49. The Kirgan court answered the question of whether an attorney is liable to a testa-
mentary beneficiary for the negligent drafting of a will with a "definite maybe." 60 
Md. App. at 3, 478 A.2d at 714. 
50. 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985). 
51. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 130, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (1985). 
360 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
have been an intent to benefit [the nonclient]."52 If the third party al-
leges and proves the remaining elements of a cause of action, he can re-
cover against the attorney in negligence. 53 
The action for breach of warranties was rejected because the plain-
tiffs failed to allege a contractual relationship or a statute that would 
extend a warranty under the circumstances. 54 The action for negligence 
also was rejected because the plaintiffs failed to "establish an employ-
ment relationship between [themselves] and the attorney."55 The action 
for negligent misrepresentation, however, was sufficient under the third 
party beneficiary exception because the plaintiffs alleged, "the hiring of 
[the attorney] was intended to benefit the [mortgagees] as well as the 
[mortgagor] in that both had identical interests in the property."56 The 
court explained that the third party beneficiary exception ordinarily is 
inapplicable in the adversarial context57 and discussed the potential for 
conflicting interests between mortgagor and mortgagee in real estate 
transactions. 58 Notwithstanding, the Flaherty court found that the 
pleaded facts gave rise to an inference that the mortgagor and mortgagee 
had identical interests; accordingly, the declaration withstood a 
demurrer. 59 
Flaherty clarifies Maryland's position on the application of the third 
party beneficiary exception in attorney malpractice cases. The court rec-
ognized that the court of special appeals interpreted the Prescott holding 
to be "peculiarly applicable"60 to contract actions. Nevertheless, the Fla-
herty court found that the third party beneficiary theory has a broader 
52. /d. at 131, 492 A.2d at 625. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. at 135, 492 A.2d at 627 (express or implied warranties arise only as provided by 
law or as they are established under a contractual relationship). 
55. /d. at 134, 492 A.2d at 627. Relying upon the test adopted in Kendall, the Flaherty 
court held that an employment relationship was a prerequisite to a legal malpractice 
action in negligence. The employment agreement, however, need not be express in 
all cases. /d. (citing Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 549, 270 A.2d 662, 
666 (1970)). 
56. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629-30. 
57. /d. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626. 
58. /d. at 137-38, 492 A.2d at 629. Real estate transactions are conducive to conflicts of 
interest. See Durfee, Third Party Malpractice Claims Against Real Estate Laywers, 
13 CoLO. LAW. 996 (1984). 
59. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629-30. The Flaherty court held that the 
claim of negligent misrepresentation was sufficient to withstand a demurrer. To 
withstand a demurrer, a party need only allege facts that, if proven, would entitle 
him to relief. Demurrers were abolished in Maryland when the revised Maryland 
Rules became effective on July I, 1984. /d. at 135 n.7, 492 A.2d at 628 n.7; MD. R. 
2-302. Under the revised rules, a party can now bring a motion for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. MD. R. 2-322(b)(2). The court discussed 
two inconclusive factors to determine whether the buyers were intended third party 
beneficiaries: (1) the buyers' election to go to settlement without retaining separate 
counsel; and (2) the differing interests of the mortgagor and the mortgagee through-
out the mortgage process, causing a possible conflict of interest if one attorney rep-
resents both. /d. at 136-38, 492 A.2d at 628-29. 
60. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 130, 492 A.2d at 625. 
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range of application than contract actions. 61 If the attorney malpractice 
claim is based upon a negligence theory, the plaintiff may allege that the 
attorney owed him the same duty as that owed to a third party benefici-
ary based upon a contract theory.62 The court stated that it essentially 
had adopted this test in Prescott. 63 
The Flaherty court implicitly rejected the balancing test theory for 
the more predictable third party beneficiary theory approach. 64 In 
adopting the third party beneficiary exception, the court adhered to the 
policy reasons underlying the privity requirement; the contractual parties 
are neither deprived of control over their own agreement, nor burdened 
with a duty to the general public. 65 The third party beneficiary exception 
is also consistent with the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: an 
attorney should have an undivided loyalty to his client unless the client 
clearly intended his hiring to benefit a third party.66 The third party 
beneficiary exception is not satisfied unless the client's intent to benefit 
the plaintiff is actual. 67 The balancing test theory, on the other hand, 
may be satisfied if, after consideration of the other factors, the effect of 
the attorney's undertaking on the nonclient was foreseeable. 68 Conse-
quently, the third party beneficiary theory applies to intended third par-
ties; the balancing theory applies to foreseeable third parties.69 Limiting 
an attorney's duty in terms of the client's actual intent to benefit, instead 
of in terms of foreseeability, provides a more predictable guideline for 
determining attorney liability to a third party and prevents litigation 
brought by those who may benefit indirectly from an attorney's 
performance. 70 
61. /d. at 130, 492 A.2d at 625. 
62. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 80, at 159-60. 
63. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492 A.2d at 625. 
64. /d. at 123-26, 130, 492 A.2d at 621-23, 625 (implicitly rejecting the balancing test 
theory by discussing both theories and adhering to the third party beneficiary excep-
tion). The court identified two other theories, the assumption of duty theory and 
the fiduciary or agency theory, but expressed no opinion as to their validity in Mary-
land. /d. at 123 n.4, 492 A.2d at 621 n.4. 
65. /d. at 130-31, 492 A.2d at 625. The test as articulated by Flaherty requires that the 
client have actual intent to benefit the third party. This requirement ensures that 
contractual parties have control over their agreement. For the policy reasons un-
derlying the privity requirement, see supra text accompanying note 13. 
66. See MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986), Rule 1.7 (loyalty to a 
client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to a client without cli-
ent's consent), Rule 1.3 (an attorney must represent his client zealously within the 
bounds of the law). The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted on 
May 23, 1986, and took effect on January 1, 1987, replacing the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 13:11 Md. Reg. 3 (May 23, 1986). 
67. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492 A.2d at 625-26. 
68. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Commentators have suggested, however, 
that the predominant inquiry under the balancing test theory generally has been 
whether the services were intended to benefit the plaintiff. See MALLEN & LEVIT, 
supra note 10, § 80, at 157. 
69. See Note, Attorney's Liability, supra note 31, at 60-61; Note, Attorney Malpractice, 
supra note 25, at 543-44. 
70. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626. 
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Nevertheless, the Flaherty court's application of the third party ben-
eficiary exception is inconsistent with the third party beneficiary excep-
tion as applied by other jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions, an ordinary 
negligence action requires proof that the attorney owed the plaintiff a 
duty. 71 Proof that the plaintiff is a third party beneficiary establishes this 
duty. 72 Therefore, the third party beneficiary exception is applicable to 
ordinary negligence actions in other jurisdictions. 73 In Maryland, how-
ever, an ordinary negligence action requires proof, not only that the at-
torney owed the plaintiff a duty, but also that the attorney was employed 
by the plaintiff. 74 Although proof that the plaintiff is a third party benefi-
ciary establishes the general duty, it does not establish the employment 
relationship with the plaintiff. 75 Therefore, the third party beneficiary 
exception, in effect, is inapplicable to ordinary negligence actions in 
Maryland. 
Although insufficient to prove an ordinary negligence action, the 
third party beneficiary exception is sufficient to prove a negligent misrep-
resentation action. Negligent misrepresentation in Maryland does not 
require proof that the plaintiff employed the attorney.76 Nevertheless, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's statement was false and that 
he intended the plaintiff to act upon it with knowledge that the plaintiff's 
reliance would cause injury.77 Furthermore, the third party beneficiary 
exception is applicable only to nonadversarial transactions. 78 As applied 
in Maryland, the third party beneficiary exception is only available to 
those plaintiffs who can prove that they suffered injury in a nonadver-
sarial context from a misrepresentation, not from mere negligence. 79 
This exception will be available to a very narrow class of potential 
plaintiffs. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
72. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 80, at 156. 
73. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982); Woodfork v. 
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 259 La. 757, 252 So. 2d 455 
(1971); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 
(1983). 
74. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 134,492 A.2d at 627 (citing Kendall v. Rodgers, 181 Md. 606, 
612, 31 A.2d 312, 315 (1943)). 
75. Haherty, 303 Md. at 134, 492 A.2d at 627. 
76. See supra text accompanying note 40. The tort of negligent misrepresentation is of 
fairly recent origin. The Court of Appeals of Maryland first recognized a cause of 
action separate from one in fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit in 1938. Virginia 
Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938) (cited in Ward Dev. Co. v. 
Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645,493 A.2d 421 (1985)). This action has been applied when 
the special relationship between the parties justifies the plaintiff's reliance upon the 
truth of the defendant's statements, as well as to arms-length commercial transac-
tions. In Maryland, this action was not applied in an attorney malpractice setting 
until Flaherty. 
77. See supra note 40. 
78. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 137, 492 A.2d at 629. 
79. Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626 (exception limited to nonadversarial actions brought in 
negligent misrepresentation). But see Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 
N.E.2d 96 (1982) (nonclient recovery allowed in negligence). 
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Notwithstanding, the third party beneficiary exception should be 
available to those plaintiffs who can prove ordinary negligence. The em-
ployment relationship element necessary to prove negligence was 
adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland forty-two years ago when 
privity was the rule without exception in attorney malpractice cases. 80 
Arguably, the employment relationship initially was required to establish 
privity between the parties. 81 Once a duty is established, the policy rea-
sons for the privity requirement are satisfied. Today, the third party ben-
eficiary theory can establish that duty. Nevertheless, the Flaherty court 
found that, aside from a duty, an employment relationship was a prereq-
uisite for maintaining a negligence action in attorney malpractice. 82 The 
requirement is unnecessary because the third party beneficiary theory 
was intended to act as an exception to the privity requirement. 83 By re-
taining the employment requirement, the Flaherty court has prevented 
any nonclient or plaintiff who has not hired the attorney from maintain-
ing an attorney malpractice action in ordinary negligence. Thus, 
although purporting to recognize the same third party beneficiary excep-
tion as recognized by other jurisdictions, the Flaherty court's application 
of the exception is a continuation of the strict privity requirement in ordi-
nary negligence actions. 
The Flaherty court's recognition of the third party beneficiary ex-
ception to the strict privity requirement in attorney malpractice cases 
based on negligence will not expose Maryland attorneys to a flood of 
malpractice claims by nonclients. The court has limited the class of po-
tential plaintiffs to intended beneficiaries whose interests are the same as 
those of the attorney's client and who can show a misrepresentation. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, should remove the attorney's 
employment element in negligence claims so that the third party benefici-
ary exception as applied in Maryland is consistent with its purpose. 
Courtney Blair Michel 
80. Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 612, 31 A.2d 312, 315 (1943) (adopting tripartite 
test from Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916)). 
81. MEISELMAN, supra note 10, § 2.1, at 13 (the employment contract gives rise to the 
legal duty); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 10, § 101, at 171 (the duty arises from, 
and because of, the attorney-client relationship). Aside from establishing the attor-
ney's duty, it is unclear what other purpose the "attorney's employment" require-
ment serves. 
82. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 134, 492 A.2d at 627. 
83. Id. at 125, 492 A.2d at 622. 
